Ignorance of law: a philosophical inquiry
Douglas N. Husak
This book argues that ignorance of law should usually be a complete excuse from criminal liability. It defends this conclusion by invoking two presumptions: first, the content of criminal law should conform to morality; second, mistakes of fact and mistakes of law should be treated symmetrically. The author grounds his position in an underlying theory of moral and criminal responsibility according to which blameworthiness consists in a defective response to the moral reasons one has.
Abstract: This book argues that ignorance of law should usually be a complete excuse from criminal liability. It defends this conclusion by invoking two presumptions: first, the content of criminal law should conform to morality; second, mistakes of fact and mistakes of law should be treated symmetrically.
Abstract: This book argues that ignorance of law should usually be a complete excuse from criminal liability. It defends this conclusion by invoking two presumptions: first, the content of criminal law should conform to morality; second, mistakes of fact and mistakes of law should be treated symmetrically.
Ano:
2016
Edição:
1
Editora:
Oxford University Press
Idioma:
english
Páginas:
320
ISBN 10:
0190604719
ISBN 13:
9780190604714
Série:
Oxford Legal Philosophy
Arquivo:
PDF, 1.85 MB
IPFS:
,
english, 2016